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Competency and Voters with Psychiatric
Disabilities: Considerations for Social Workers
JENNIFER K. DAVIS
Indiana University Northwest
Division of Social Work
The ability of those with psychiatric disabilities to vote is an im-
portant activity impacted by competency issues and potential-
ly overlooked by social workers. The purpose of this article is to
assist social workers in making informed decisions about preserv-
ing and supporting voter participation among those with psychi-
atric disabilities. Common issues regarding the voting rights of
individuals with psychiatric disabilities within the legal system
and other systems of interest to social workers are explored.
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Voting is defined by, and in turn defines, the democratic
process. The Supreme Court deemed voting a "fundamental
right" and declared, "no right is more precious" (Harper v.
Virginia, 1966; Wesberry v. Sanders, 1964). To exercise one's
right to vote is the manifestation of personal power in the se-
lection of leadership that will represent the values and needs
of the individual. The National Association of Social Workers
expresses these sentiments by speaking to the right itself,
"voting is a basic right, and citizens should be assisted in all
possible ways to exercise that right; any action that denies
access or discourages any citizen from voting should be pro-
hibited" and by speaking to the responsibilities of the profes-
sion... social workers are encouraged to help educate clients to
be informed voters and to mobilize them to vote in elections"
(2006, p. 377). Social workers can be instrumental in further-
ing voter participation and eliminating the barriers that affect
it. They act both as agents for empowerment of those with
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psychiatric disabilities, helping them move toward normal-
ized and productive community participation and as overseers
of the rights for these individuals to take action on their own
behalves (Coppock & Dunn, 2009). However, in order to do so,
social workers must familiarize themselves with obstacles to
voting that lie both inside and outside of the legal system.
Individuals with psychiatric disabilities commonly face
voting disenfranchisement because of concerns about their
competence to vote (Schur, Adya, & Kruse, 2008). The legal
disenfranchisement of those with psychiatric disabilities is
achieved, however innocently, through the appointment of
a guardian, which results in the person's loss of legal rights
(Schriner, Ochs, & Shields, 1997). As informants about con-
sumer functioning in the guardianship process, social workers
are often instrumental in determining the outcome of guard-
ianship proceedings to include the preservation of voting
rights. The social work role in addressing voter participation
also rests in the need for social workers to confront their own
perceptions of voter competence. Are these perceptions based
on an accurate definition and assessment of voter competency?
The purpose of this article is to assist social workers in
making informed decisions about preserving and supporting
voter participation among those with psychiatric disabilities.
Framed by a socio-legal perspective, contemporary law re-
garding voting rights and guardianship, a legal definition of
competency and a proposed assessment for voter competency
are presented. This article then proceeds to examine barriers
to voting that occur outside of the legal system and how social
workers can advocate in these situations.
At the outset, it is important to note that the literature in
the area of voter rights and voter competence primarily ad-
dresses cognitive impairments as the disability of concern.
Legal writings related to psychiatric disabilities and voting
rights are sparse. There are important differences in function-
al impairments between those with cognitive disabilities and
those with psychiatric disabilities. However, the legal system
perceives these functional disabilities as similar, thus making
the application of this literature to those with psychiatric dis-
abilities credible.
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Competence, Voting Rights & Legal Guardianship
Throughout American history the suffrage struggles of
disenfranchised groups, women, persons of color, and most
recently, those with disabilities, reflect the importance and
power of voting. Withholding the right to vote from certain
categories of citizens has been justified as necessary to "main-
tain the intelligence and integrity of the electorate" (Hurme &
Appelbaum, 2007, p. 932). Past suffrage battles were waged
to fight the assumption that categorization by color, gender or
disability posed an inherent threat to a credible electorate.
The victory for voting rights is reflected in the fifteenth
and nineteenth amendments of the United States Constitution,
the supreme law of the land and several Acts of Congress.
The Fifteenth Amendment reads, "the right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude" (Constitutional Amendment XV, section
1). The Nineteenth Amendment provides the same protec-
tions for women, ensuring that women have the right to vote
(Constitutional Amendment XIX).
Further protections of voting rights were provided by the
United States Congress with the passing of the Voting Rights
Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
and the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (Keyssar,
2000; Monk, 2003; Schriner, Ochs, & Shields, 1997). The Voting
Rights Act of 1964 supplemented the Fifteenth Amendment's
protection of racial minorities by prohibiting the practice of
requiring "otherwise qualified voters to pass literacy tests in
order to register to vote" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1965).
Voter protection was extended to those with disabilities
through The Americans with Disabilities Act by requiring that
polling places be physically accessible to people with disabili-
ties when federal elections occur (U.S. Department of Justice,
1984). Individuals with disabilities received additional protec-
tion from the National Voter Registration Act, which requires
voter registration opportunities to be in place in all offices that
provide public assistance and within state funded programs
that provide services to individuals with disabilities (U.S.
Department of Justice, 1965).
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Regardless of the progress that has been made in the pro-
tection of voting rights, those with developmental disabilities,
cognitive impairments, and psychiatric disabilities face voting
disenfranchisement based on concerns about their competence
to vote, or lack thereof. The states rule in this regard; the federal
laws, which address voting rights, do not preempt the states'
authority to disqualify voters based on their competency, or
lack thereof.
Voting Rights & Guardianship Reforms
Competency is an issue at the center of all guardianship
laws, which are generally constructed and enforced by the
separate states. Reforms in guardianship laws have begun to
address the right to vote. One contributor to this wave of reform
is found in the 2001 Maine case of Doe v. Rowe. In this case, the
plaintiffs, three women with psychiatric disabilities who were
denied the right to vote, claimed that, "Maine's disenfranchise-
ment of those under guardianship by reason of mental illness
failed to provide adequate procedural due process" (Doe and
the Disability Rights Center of Maine v. Rowe, 2001). The court
that placed the women under guardianship did not specifical-
ly consider the right to vote as a distinct aspect of its decision
and failed to notify each woman that her right to vote would
be automatically suspended when the guardianship order was
given. One of the women obtained a modification to her guard-
ianship order and subsequently voted in the 2000 state and
federal elections. The other women's orders were not modified
and they sued the state, asserting that the state's guardianship
law amounted to a constitutional disenfranchisement in viola-
tion of the 14 th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Doe and
the Disability Rights Center of Maine v. Rowe, 2001).
The 14th Amendment grants citizens "equal protec-
tion under the law" (U.S. Constitutional Amendment XIV).
Within this amendment are The Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause, both of which having bearing on voting
rights. The Due Process clause prohibits the states from "de-
priving any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law" (U.S. Constitutional Amendment XIV) and
requires that "the content of the law, not just the procedures,
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must be fair" (Substantive Due Process) (Monk, 2003, p. 215)
and asserts that the government cannot, "deny a citizen a
benefit without notice and a hearing" (Procedural Due Process)
(Monk, 2003, p. 171). Further, the Equal Protection Clause pro-
hibits unreasonable discrimination; if the effects of a law are
that similarly situated people are treated differently, the state
must demonstrate a legitimate reason for the differential treat-
ment (Monk, 2003).
In the case of Doe v. Rowe, the court found that the court's
ruling, which resulted in the women being denied the right to
vote, violated the due process provisions of the 14' h Amendment
because "the practice of probate courts failed to ensure uni-
formly adequate notice regarding the potential disenfranchise-
ment effect of being placed under guardianship" (Doe and the
Disability Rights Center of Maine v. Rowe, 2001). This is clearly
a procedural due process argument. In the same case, substan-
tive due process issues were addressed when the court found
that "the Equal Protection Clause was violated because guard-
ianship for reasons of mental illness was an inadequate proxy
for the capacity to vote" (Doe and the Disability Rights Center
of Maine v. Rowe, 2001). In other words, just because one is
subject to a guardianship order does not mean that her compe-
tence to vote has been disproved.
In the context of overall guardianship reform, Doe v. Rowe
gave legal teeth to the right of individuals to have their voting
rights specifically addressed during guardianship proceed-
ings and to be informed of the outcome. As a result, 18 states
now specifically provide for judicial determination of the ca-
pacity of the individual to vote. In seven states, when deemed
to be incompetent, the individual still continues to lose his or
her right to vote without having the opportunity for the spe-
cific determination of voting capacity (Hurme & Appelbaum,
2007). An alternative approach to resolving this competency-
voting rights issue is the automatic retention of voting rights
unless the right is specifically challenged, a seemingly just ap-
proach (Sabatino & Spurgeon, 2007). A number of states have
incorporated this alternative by amending their laws: Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia,
Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
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Vermont, and Washington State (Hurme & Appelbaum, 2007).
Of course, it may well be that the most just approach is that
of a voter qualification process that does not take into con-
sideration psychiatric disability or guardianship. The laws
of Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Colorado, Kansas, Michigan, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania contain no stat-
utes that allow the disqualification of voters due to psychiatric
disability or guardianship (Hurme & Appelbaum, 2007).
Including a separate adjudication of one's capacity to
vote within limited guardianship proceedings is a signifi-
cant advancement in protecting the rights of those with psy-
chiatric disabilities, but still one which is bittersweet. While
decisions are made about limiting the rights of the individual
due to incompetence, the preservation of voting rights is ex-
plicitly being addressed, the finding of incompetence means
that certain other rights are limited. And, the determination
of voting capacity within a limited guardianship is not a fool-
proof guarantee against voter disenfranchisement. In Missouri
Protection and Advocacy Services v. State of Missouri (2007),
a claim was made against the state of Missouri for categori-
cally barring the voter, Mr. Prye, from exercising his right to
vote, even though the probate judge had expressly found him
competent to vote and did not limit his right to vote at the
time of his guardianship proceeding. On appeal, the Court af-
firmed the district court's decision for the plaintiffs, finding
"while Missouri law generally bans voting by citizens who are
incapacitated, that ban is not absolute because probate courts
have explicitly preserved the voting rights of some individuals
when appointing guardians for them" (Missouri Protection v.
Missouri, 2007, 1078, 1081).
Categorical Versus Functional
Determination of Voter Competency
The Maine and Missouri decisions reviewed above high-
light the dangers of state laws that rely on categorical rather
than functional determinations of voter capacity. If voting ca-
pacity is treated as something that falls within the range of
human functions for which guardianship might be required,
then the right to vote is subject to a general, rather than
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specific or functional, determination. Still, progress has been
made since changes in many state laws have mandated the
specific determination of voter competency. This represents
a victory for the rights of those with psychiatric disabilities
while at the same time raising new challenges. Categorical
suspension of voter rights did not require that courts specify a
definition of and criteria for voter competency; consideration
of individual functioning requires that these specificities be
determined.
Legal Standards for Determining Voter Competency
The express rationale for the disenfranchisement of certain
groups of voters has historically been the same: the need to
maintain an intelligent electorate. An intelligent electorate
has been viewed as essential to the well-being of democracy
throughout U.S. history and has served as the rationale for
limiting suffrage based on specific demographic criteria, such
as gender, race and socio-economic status. The white, male
property owner was presumed to have the necessary intelli-
gence to protect the validity of our political system. Thus, as
the thinking went, to have only the most "qualified" individu-
als participate in the democratic process would result in intelli-
gent and productive selections for the leadership of our society
(Keyssar, 2000).
The criteria used to determine one's capacity to participate
in an intelligent electorate have all been deemed unconstitu-
tional when challenged in the courts-land ownership, civics
tests, and intelligence tests have all been eliminated (Schriner,
Ochs, & Shields, 1997). The last remaining means of legally
preventing a citizen from voting is the determination of one's
mental incompetency to do so. Of course the state has a vested
interest in protecting the integrity of the voting process (Hurme
& Appelbaum, 2007). If the voting public were to perceive that
incompetent individuals routinely cast ballots, the credibility
with which the competent voter views the process of select-
ing leaders and issues for their support might be diminished.
Competent adults may wonder if the electoral process is that
important if anyone, including those perceived as incompe-
tent, are allowed to participate in it (Hurme &Appelbaum,
2007).
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Current Competency Standards
The avenue for protecting the integrity of the process while
allowing all capable individuals the opportunity to vote lies in
the establishment of clear criteria for determining voting ca-
pacity. This complex and difficult task requires that there be
agreement on criteria by each state for each state. As a remedy
for this complexity, a federal competency standard for all elec-
tions has been proposed, although the specific competency cri-
teria to be used have yet to be determined. But the proponents
of federalism argue that states should have the ability to deter-
mine their own competency standards (Karlan, 2007).
As a result of these tensions, a compromise proposal was
offered by a group of policy scholars who suggested that uni-
versal standards for federal elections be enacted and then the
states be allowed to devise and maintain their own standards
for state and local elections. Not surprisingly, the logistical
complications of trying to maintain and enforce two sets of
competency standards were thought to be unrealistic and the
proposal was dropped (Karlan, 2007). In the end, the devising
of standards for determining voter competence has remained
the responsibility of each individual state.
Few state laws provide clear and specific criteria for who has
and does not have the capacity to vote (Hurme & Appelbaum,
2007). Only four states give specific direction to their judges as
to what should be considered when determining voter com-
petency. In Delaware, the direction provided to judges does
not include clear criteria for determining competency; instead,
the direction sets out the standard of proof required to prove
incompetence. That standard calls for clear and convincing
evidence of "severe cognitive impairment, which precludes
exercise of basic voting judgment" (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 15,
secs. 1701 as cited in Hurme & Appelbaum, 2007). Iowa courts
may find a voter to be incompetent only when "the individual
lacks sufficient mental capacity to comprehend and exercise
the right to vote" (Iowa Code Ann. secs. 633.556[1] as citied
in Hurme & Appelbaum, 2007). In Washington state, the law
provides criteria for voter competency requiring that courts
determine "that the person is incompetent for purposes of
rationally exercising the franchise in that the individual lacks
the capacity to understand the nature and effect of voting such
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that she or he cannot make an individual choice" (Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. secs. 11.88.010[5] as cited in Hurme & Appelbaum,
2007). Wisconsin courts must find that the person "is incapable
of understanding the objective of the elective process" (Wis.
Stat. Ann. secs. 54.25[2][c] 1.g as cited in Hurme & Appelbaum,
2007).
The above standards represent earnest efforts toward es-
tablishing fair criteria in assessing voter competence, however
all but one standard remains difficult to apply when making
a competency and voting rights determination. Washington
state criteria call for the determination of the person's ability
to make decisions and his or her awareness of the effect and
the nature of voting. These more specific criteria imply an
actual assessment of the voter's understanding of the process.
As such, it avoids some of the limits found in other proposed
criteria. For example, another proposed set of criteria called for
an assessment of the level of a person's knowledge of the issues
and the candidates listed on a given ballot. Aside from the
very real and common problem of perfectly competent voters
walking into the booth on election day only to find a name or
a referendum about which they know or have heard nothing,
two additional and related problems exist. First, it is difficult
to determine what amount or level of knowledge regarding
candidates and election issues is required to cast an intelligent
ballot (Schriner, Ochs, & Shields, 1997). Second, if these criteria
for voting capacity could not be met by many in the elector-
ate because most voters only possess a superficial knowledge
of major ballot issues and candidates (Watkins, 2007; Schriner,
Ochs, & Shields, 1997), would it not be a violation of the 14 h
Amendment to exclude one group of people simply because
of their disability while allowing another group of individuals
with the same level of voter incompetence to cast its vote? The
Washington state criteria that relate to decision-making ability,
an understanding of the process and the effect of voting were
adopted by the Maine Federal District Court in Doe v. Rowe
as the functional standards for determining voter competen-
cy (Hurme & Appelbaum, 2007). These criteria not only lend
themselves to assessment, but acceptable means of accom-
plishing this assessment already exist.
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Proposed Competency Standards
The assessment of competency to make decisions on one's
own behalf is regularly required for medical consent. Research
has produced a number of possible standards to use in this as-
sessment. In recent years, the courts have recognized a limited
number of standards to determine decision-making capacity.
Four standards are found in the law, each addressing a differ-
ent aspect of decision-making ability: (1) to express a choice;
(2) to understand information relevant to the decision about
treatment; (3) to appreciate the significance for one's own situ-
ation of the information disclosed about the illness and pos-
sible treatments; and (4) to manipulate the information ratio-
nally (or reason about it) in a manner that allows one to make
comparisons and weigh options (Grisson & Appelbaum, 1995).
These four standards reflect a rigorous set of requirements for
decision-making capacity.
Based on the potential for harm if an individual makes an
erroneous decision about medical treatment, this rigor is justi-
fied. But when considering these standards in the context of
voting, the need for this level of rigor falters. In reality the po-
tential for harm done to the individual or society is minimal if
the individual's vote is contrary to how she would have voted
if not impaired. Hurme and Appelbaum (2007) posit that due
to the lesser potential for harm, the reasoning and appreciation
standards found in the medical consent criteria provide unnec-
essary rigor for voting competency.
Two of the standards, the ability to make a choice and to
understand information relevant to the decision are similar
to the criteria found in the Washington/Doe standard. These
two criteria are believed to provide a level of rigor in keeping
with the gravity of decisions made by voters. Thus, the use
of an adapted version of established decision-making criteria
seems sensible. The perspective of voting as a decision-making
process and the realistic assessment of the substantive require-
ments of the decision is more accurate, realistic, and inclusive.
The perspective of voting as an intellectual exercise that must
be performed by individuals well-versed in the specific issues
and platforms of each candidate is an ideal still used to distin-
guish competent and incompetent voters. This is neither realis-
tic, reflective of the typical voter, nor something that reflects the
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legitimacy of the individual vote. Having an understanding of
the office to be held by the candidate and the general duties of
that office reflect an informed decision and require a realistic
level of voter knowledge. The rigorous requirement that the
voter have an in-depth knowledge of issues and of candidates
has been used historically to disenfranchise the voter.
Other standards have been proposed that provide guid-
ance to the courts in determining one's competency to vote.
The American Bar Association posits that,
any person who is able to provide the information,
whether orally, in writing, through an interpreter or
interpretive device or otherwise, which is reasonably
required of all persons seeking to register to vote and
allowed to cast a ballot in any election held in the
election precinct where the voter is registered, shall be
considered a qualified voter of this state..." (American
Bar Association, as cited in Schriner, Ochs, & Shields,
2000, p. 451)
This standard has been adopted by the state of California
to determine voter competency (Schriner, Ochs, & Shields,
2000). It represents a threshold of capacity that is somewhat
lower than that of the Washington/Doe standard. This stan-
dard does not require the cognitive machinations of decision-
making and awareness of effects but only the ability to com-
municate minimal demographic information. It would allow
more individuals to be determined competent to vote, as it
would not take into account one's decision-making ability, and
that ability that may vary depending on time, place and situ-
ation. The question remains however, whether this standard
applies the appropriate level of rigor required to uphold the
legitimacy of the election process. Perhaps not. The ability to
make a decision is inherent in the ability to cast a vote. If one
is not able to make a decision, then he or she will not be able
to vote without another making the decision for him or her.
That kind of scheme does not lend itself to a credible election
process.
Therein lies another level of complexity in determin-
ing competency standards, balancing the needs of the elec-
torate with standards of competency that allow the most
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competent individuals to vote. Each state is left to decide how
to find this balance. Unfortunately, many still have not begun
to examine specific, applicable standards for determining voter
competence. They continue to rely on the opinions of profes-
sionals, including social workers, who make voter competen-
cy determinations based on the individual's overall ability to
care for themselves and manage their affairs (Karwalish et al.,
2008).
Barriers to Voting Outside of the Legal System
The determination of voter capacity has been appropri-
ately maintained in the legal system. The obvious barriers to
voting faced by citizens who have psychiatric disabilities and
the progress toward their resolution have been discussed thus
far. However, in reality, individuals outside of the legal system
present additional barriers to voting. This occurs when profes-
sionals, caretakers, and others outside of the judicial setting
make judgments, typically outside of the law, about who is
competent to vote. One study of three long-term care facili-
ties found that two of the three facilities assessed voter capac-
ity and the assessments were performed exclusively by indi-
vidual staff members in a non-systematic manner. Each staff
created his or her own individual standards for voter compe-
tency without the benefit of training on the election laws of
their state (Karlawish et al., 2008). Social workers are among
the most common service providers of psychiatric services and
so are likely to participate in and perhaps even perform this
type of uninformed assessment.
Of particular concern is the body of evidence that suggests
that election officials make independent, ad hoc decisions re-
garding voter competency. Individuals who present to register
to vote or cast a ballot may be denied on the basis of their ap-
pearance, behavior, or the personal knowledge of the election
official about the individual's diagnosis (Karlan, 2007).
The illegality of this behavior was determined in 1976
when an individual with mental retardation who was not per-
mitted to register to vote by election officials brought a case.
In this case, Carroll v. Cobb, the court ruled that election offi-
cials were not permitted to assess individuals for competency
to vote (Carroll v. Cobb, 1976). While the court long ago de-
termined that determinations by election officials are illegal,
Competency and Voters with Psychiatric Disabilities 59
they do continue. The Public Advocate in New Jersey took an
aggressive and thorough approach to the problem. Prior to the
2006 election, Ronald Chen sent a letter to each disabled indi-
vidual in the state that laid out their rights to vote, the voting
laws, voting accommodations under the ADA, and resources
for redress if they experienced difficulties registering or at the
polls. With emphasis, Mr. Chen encouraged the recipients to
take the letter with them to the polls "in case any questions
arise while you are there" (New Jersey Department of the
Public Advocate, 2006). This effort represents a proactive and
dedicated response to the voting needs of the disabled, includ-
ing those with psychiatric disabilities, and a useful source of
education for election officials. Social workers also have an
opportunity to support voter participation through advocacy
efforts with election officials. This can occur by accompanying
consumers throughout the voting process (registration, polls)
and/or by contacting election officials as an agency to ensure
that proper voting laws will be followed.
Conclusion
The voting rights of those with psychiatric disabilities
under guardianship, the standards by which voter competen-
cy may be established, and other barriers to voting have been
explored. However, the corollary of the above issues is the
voter participation of those with psychiatric disabilities who
do not have guardians and barriers to voting that they face.
Social workers are in a unique position to address the barriers
to voter participation and the competency issues confronting
this population. The next step in addressing these issues likely
requires that we as a profession examine how supporting the
voting rights of those with psychiatric disabilities can become
a greater priority.
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